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For the approximate two hundred years of their 
relationship, the federal government has dictated the life 
situation of Indians. The federal government has vacillated 
in both the method and goal in its role as dominate 
partner. Indian tribes have sometimes been regarded as 
governments through treaties; viewed as immigrants in plans 
of assimilation; and have been viewed as a "primitive 
peoples" to be preserved from modern day corruption. Most 
recently, they have been offered self-determination, - i.e., 
the eventual power to assimilate and to preserve their 
heritage as they as Indians desire. The government, 
however, has not relinquished this control easily; if at 
all. This study shows that the government nor the Indians 
are completely to blame for the slow progress of the 
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INTRODUCTION
Public Law 93-638 is, in reality, a policy of 
"termination" of the federal trust Responsibility for the 
Native American. It is not in the same sense as terrible 
and traumatic as P.L. 83-280 which eliminated the Indian 
reservation as a Federal protected preserve for exclusive 
Indian use and handed jurisdiction of services for the 
Indian to the state and without consent of the affected 
tribes. This new "termination" policy is of a more 
voluntary nature. It will not only affect the Indian on his 
reservation but is currently affecting some of the 
"Washington Redskins" on their agencies. This policy has 
been aptly named: "The Indian Self-Determination and 
Educational Assistance Act."
This paper will present some of the facts and will 
focus mainly on one government agency, the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs or BIA. The BIA serves the Indian population of 
this country and the funds used to administer this policy of 
self-determination represent only a small portion of the 
agency's budget for each fiscal year (FY). This paper will 
focus on the history of the policy's origination, it's legal 
interpretation, and how the BIA responded to the idea of 
giving the Indians self-determination, given the 
circumstances that the BIA was in at the time.
Legal History
Historically, the U.S. Government had two types of 
responsibility for the American Indian: protection of their 
property and provision of public services that were not 
usually available through regular channels (Congress and the 
Nation, 1945-64). The Indians right to public services was 
based on their right to federal protection of their 
property. The protective function dates back to colonial 
days. The public services function dates back to the 
beginnings of the United States Constitution. For many 
years the Federal Government protected the Indian from his 
own incompetence and improvidence and stood in a guardian 
capacity to the Indian (Congress and the Nation, 1945- 
1964). The Government managed most Indian legal affairs 
including land, income, law and order and provided most 
services to the Indian including health, education and 
economic development.
The War Department was the original administrative 
agency handling Indian affairs. The Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) was established in the War Department in 
1824. In 1849, BIA was transferred to the newly established 
Department of the Interior; where it remains presently. In 
1955, Federal responsibility for medical and health-related 
services was transferred to the Public Health Service in the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
Through the years, the Indian has been subject to
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changing federal policies which varied from patronage, to 
total oblivion to the situation, back to paternalism, to the 
current one of funded guidance. In 1934 the Wheeler-Howard 
Act brought about the beginnings of current Federal policy 
in that it stressed self-determination for tribal 
governments; with Federal assistance (Philip, 1986). In the 
1950's, under the Eisenhower Administration, the policy of 
termination ended in total disaster for many Indians. This 
Termination Act was an attempt to assimilate Indians into 
the non-Indian culture through the dissolving of 
reservations and ending their special relationship with the 
Federal government.
The July 8, 1970, Message to Congress on Indian Affairs 
presented by President Richard M. Nixon contained what is 
claimed to be the current official government stand on 
Indian Affairs (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970). It 
proclaimed for the executive branch of the Federal 
Government, the Indian's right to self-determination in 
tribal affairs and it marked the end of both "paternalism" 
and forced assimilation. In a phrase that became the slogan 
of his Indian policy, Nixon called for "self-determination 
without termination." This promise rejected two extremes; 
Federal termination on the one hand and Federal paternalism 
on the other. The message called for increased 
congressional action on the passing of legislation for 
funding and federal assistance of Indian tribal attempts to 
gain self-government status. The federal government,
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consisting of various councils on Indian affairs, the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Office of Economic Opportunity 
(0E0) - Indian Desk - and Congressional Subcommittees on 
Indian Affairs have historically taken a position of 
authoritarian "servitude" to the American Indian.
The legislative movement for the policy began with the 
Senate's introduction of Senate Bill S. 1017 in 1973. When 
the bill was first introduced, it had the singular purpose 
of reforming the Johnson-0'Malley Act - which is a 193A law 
in that the Federal Government or BIA could contract with 
states and territories to provide education to Indians. It 
was brought up by the different Indian communities and 
advocacy groups that another educational program was not 
really needed but one with a stronger contracting authority 
that would enable tribes to contract for Bureau of Indian 
Affairs and Indian Health Service programs as well as 
educational programs (Prucha, 1985). As a result of 
extensive hearings, the scope of S. 1017 expanded to include 
all facets of services and programs of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs and the Indian Health Service. The full version of 
the bill had two titles: Title I contains the self- 
determination and contracting provisions. Title II provided 
for the reform, through self-determination, of BIA 
educational services. When S. 1017 was still in Committee, 
most of the amendments made were recommended by the 
Department of the Interior and the General Accounting Office 
(Congressional and Administrative News, 1975). An amendment
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proposed by the Subcommittee on Indian affairs that provided 
certain early retirement benefits for non-Indian employees 
of the BIA and IHS who would be adversely affected by the 
Indian preference laws, was rejected by the Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs to whom the bill (S. 1017) was 
referred. As such, the bill was reported out of Joint 
Committee on December 19, 1974 and Public Law 93-638 was 
signed into law on January 4, 1975 by President Gerald R. 
Ford.
Since the process of Indian policy can be quite 
encompassing, this author will focus primarily on the 
actions or inactions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 
and at times, the Department of the Interior and and Office 
of Management and Budget. There are different constraints 
and behavior patterns attributable to the Indian Health 
Service, the Office of Indian Education, the Economic 
Development Administration, the Department of Justice and 
other agencies unmentioned but they all play important roles 
in the Indian policy process but the BIA does bear the 
overall brunt of executive responsibility. The BIA will be 
used as a major source of examples in agency patterns and 
behavior for the sake of this narrative.
When the author was researching material for this work 
he happened to notice some Indian leaders evidently have 
more influence than others. This author's feeling was that 
Indians were a powerless lot compared to the steel or oil 
interests but some do have some political leverage. There
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is an unseen network in Washington that seems to be made up 
of tribal leaders, some members of Congress, the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, the Indian Health Service and components of 
the Office of Management and Budget. It also contains two 
or three nongovernment Indian advocacy groups such as the 
National Congress of American Indians as well as a lobbyist 
or two. When legislation was in the making, familiar names 
would appear again and again. It is this instance that one 
is reminded of a Lowi article in which elite organizations, 
leaders and special interests bargain the final outcome of 
legislation as well as policy in the distribution of 
benefits.
Interpretation of the Law
P.L. 93-638 is intended to reverse longstanding Federal 
domination over Indian affairs. The law reaffirms the 
commitment of the Federal government to maintain its 
relationship with American Indian tribes and acknowledges an 
obligation to respond to tribal expressions for self- 
determination by providing opportunities for "maximum Indian 
participation" under the direction and assistance of the 
Secretary of the Interior and/or the Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare.
Close examination of Title I of the act gives Indian 
tribes the opportunity to administer Interior and HEW 
programs. Section 102 directs the Secretary of the 
Interior, if requested by any Indian tribe, to contract with 
any tribal organization in planning, conducting and
6
administering programs or program segments which BIA is 
authorized to administer for the benefit of the Indians. 
Section 103 contains similar contracting provisions for 
programs administered by IHS under authority of the 
Secretary of HEW. These sections also establish a procedure 
by which the Secretary may refuse to enter into proposed 
contracts when not in the public interest. In such cases, 
the Secretary must help tribes overcome the obstacles which 
prompted the refusal and must provide the tribes with a 
hearing and an opportunity for appeal.
Title I also authorizes the Secretaries to award grants 
to help tribes develop the capability to operate programs 
for which they might eventually contract under sections 102 
and 103. The grants would be used
1) to undertake orderly planning for the 
takeover of the more complex Federally- 
operated programs.
2) to train Indians to assume managerial and 
technical positions once the tribe has 
assumed control and management of Federal 
programs.
3) to finance a thorough evaluation of 
performance following a reasonable period 
of time in which a former Federally- 
controlled program has been administered 
by a tribe under contract.
The other sections of Title I authorized the assignment 
of Federal employees to tribal organizations to staff 
contracted programs and provide for the retention of certain 
Federal benefits for civil service employees who are hired 
by tribes and permit contracts and grants for personal 
services which would otherwise be performed by Federal
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employees. Title I also states that none of the Self- 
Determination Act's provisions authorize or require the 
termination of any existing trust responsibility of the 
United States with the Indian people.
Title II of the act involves a complicated set of 
amendments to the old Johnson-0'Malley Act (JOM) primarily 
of importance in two areas: Section 5 provides for the 
establishment of a local committee of parents of Indian 
children in schools serviced by a JOM contract and section 6 
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to pay the full per 
capita cost of educating Indian students in public schools 
if the students were residing in BIA boarding facilities and 
were not regularly residents of the state.
In looking at the federal position on Indian affairs, 
one must first define the responsibilities the government 
has to Indians and to all American citizens in general. The 
three branches of the federal government, the executive, 
judiciary and legislative all play different roles in the 
area of Indian affairs. Perhaps the most important branch, 
administratively, is the executive branch. The President 
has the responsibility of appointing people to represent the 
Indian in such areas as the Department of the Interior, the 
Indian Desks of the Departments of Health, Education and 
Welfare, and Labor and Commerce; as well as the various 
councils connected to the White House - such as the National 
Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIO) in the Office of the 
Vice President. As a result of reports from these different
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areas, he submits bills to Congress for legislation, so in 
that sense he serves as both lobbyist and administrator for 
the Indians. The President is under more of a moral 
obligation to help the Indians than a legal obligation.
The judicial branch of the Federal government is 
concerned primarily with the individual Indians or tribes 
and does not deal with the broad problems affecting the 
contemporary Indians as a whole. The Supreme Court is 
involved in law suits involving controversies having to do 
with tax, land, water and fishing rights as well as 
jurisdictional cases - such as whether an Indian can be 
charged with a crime.
Congress is usually recognized as the branch of the 
federal government that controls the Indians. There is, 
however, nowhere in the Constitution any explicit vestment 
in the Congress that gives it power to control Indians. In 
fact, the subject of Indians and their rights is mentioned 
only twice: "Indians not taxed" were to be excluded from 
determining the number of representatives a state was to be 
allowed and Congress was to have the power "to regulate 
Commerce" with the Indian tribes (U.S. Constitution, 1789).
Congress acts upon bills submitted by the President and 
interested Congressmen in the area of Indian Affairs. Bills 
concerning Indian affairs do not always get through Congress 
often as a result of poor lobbying efforts on the part of 
Indians and due to the fact that the Indians do not have a 
strong enough political voice.
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Congress hoped, in essence, that P.L. 638 was the cure 
for BIA domination of tribal affairs. The new Act promised 
to transfer Bureau programs contractually to individual 
tribes. It is figured that about once every thirty years 
there is a legislative move to end the BIA (Barsh, 1980). 
The last time it was tried was during the belt-tightening 
years of World War II. Following this, the Carter 
Administration would presume that the BIA would have to 
reorganize; thereby effecting a loss of the position of 
commissioner and the "sweeping out" of various department 
heads. This would later prove to be a handicap in the 
implementation of P.L. 638.
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IMPLEMENTATION UNDER THE FORD ADMINISTRATION
On January 4, 1975, President Gerald R. Ford signed 
into law Public Law 93-638 (Presidential Documents, 1975). 
Bureau of Indian Affairs employees were first instructed not 
to emphasize the contracting aspects but merely to work with 
tribes who requested grants or assistance by grants to 
upgrade organizational and administrative procedures of 
their tribal councils (Quetone, 1984). In fact, no tribes 
had contracted for all of 1975. Many tribes were not 
anxious to contract for the memories and horror-stories of 
termination of other tribes was still fresh in most leaders 
minds.
There are many factors that could and have slowed 
implementation of P.L. 638. First, tribal self- 
determination will be a slow, gradual process that may take 
a generation or more of cooperation, money and guidance and 
yet, there is still the question of it becoming a reality 
and reversing a pattern of dependency. The BIA and its 
programs have been a dominant power on the Indian 
reservations for more than 150 years and this introduces the 
second factor. P.L. 638 mandates that the Bureau phase 
itself out of existence and have its programs and functions 
contracted out to the Indian tribes. There is no timetable 
for the BIA to adhere to. It can and has perpetuated its 
own existence by beefing up its staff in implementing and
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advising the contract process to Indian tribes.
Congress has made the BIA and Indian Health Services 
(IHS) responsible for the very funding of the programs the 
tribes seek to contract. The Bureau can reduce funding 
without, for the most part, tribal consent. There are no 
real measures for evaluation on how well the policy is being 
implemented. In many instances there is no real economic 
base that an Indian tribe can turn to except the BIA. There 
have been no definitions of what constitutes the "trust 
responsibility"; the BIA can approve or otherwise regulate 
the alienation, disposition, encumbrance, management, 
development or use of trust resources. The time lengths on 
the contracts are often too short - 3 years - and there is 
often annual renegotiation of them which means these 
contracts are subject to cancellation at any time. Third, 
along with the lack of time table for the BIA to adhere to, 
Congress has failed to consider a planned program of change 
(Deloria, 1985). It has not enacted legislation which would 
address the future of many Bureau employees who would be 
displaced as a result of the self-determination policy.
Congress cannot be completely to blame if the 
implementation of P.L. 638 is thwarted. The position of 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the Interior Department 
was virtually vacant for 2 years and it was during the 
critical implementation stage. This meant the fabled semi- 
autonomous nature of the twelve area offices in the BIA were 
at the discretion of how P.L. 638 would be implemented. It
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would be later discovered in a Government Accounting Office 
(GAO) report that:
Some BIA implementation procedures following 
the Tribal Resolutions in Intent to Contract 
seem overtly designed to cover and threaten BIA 
employees unnecessarily. Massive Reduction in 
Force (RIF) meetings are called and announced 
in such a manner that job abolishment appears 
imminent with the basically simple explanation 
that the Tribe is contracting and your job is 
on the line.. . . (GAO, 1978: 16)
It was also discovered that though there were many contracts
awarded, hardly any BIA employees were displaced. A growing
contradiction between policy intent and policy
implementation was becoming evident.
Tribes had begun to report to Congressional Committees, 
to BIA and to national Indian organizations that they were 
being stifled by complicated bureaucratic procedures in 
administering the contracts. BIA and IHS were not giving 
them the information they needed to make the optimal 
decisions about which programs to contract and tribal 
priorities were being overridden by the Area and Central 
offices (Deloria and Lytle, 1984). Another frequent 
complaint was that much time and effort was expended on 
contract proposal rewrites to correct deficiencies which 
lengthened the contracting process longer than it should 
be. Another was that some employees of the BIA may have 
been members of the tribe who were trying to contract and 
they would try to discourage the tribe by use of the 
bogeyman "termination."
By some estimates almost 40 percent of contract funds
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earmarked for tribal programs were being skimmed by the two 
agencies, BIA and IHS, to provide for additional personnel 
and various administrative costs before the money ever 
reached the tribal contractors. Congress did not help 
matters any when they cut funding for the BIA in FY 1978 and 
many tribes contract overhead soon threatened the lives of 
different programs with extinction (GAO, 1978).
Another problem to be overcome is the "Indian 
problem." There is a question why Indians want to retain a 
separate existence from the White society and maintain their 
reservations. For many Indians it is a retreat from life in 
the city. To live as an Indian is a thought process, a 
philosophy that is intangible. The other part of the 
problem are the hundreds of different tribes of American 
Indians existing today and each has a ruling body that 
governs the daily affairs of the people of that tribe. In 
some tribes, the ruling body of elders, the tribal council, 
possesses an almost totalitarian authority, whereas in 
others, the Council is merely a figurehead with the BIA 
agency having the most influence (Szasz, 1979).
Many contemporary tribal governments received their 
authority from the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 with 
some notable exceptions (the Navajo). Many legal decisions 
are made by Tribal Councils which usually play economic, 
social, religious roles within the tribe as well as 
juridicial. The councils often share a close personal 
relationship with tribal members. This concept of
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brotherhood and responsibility for others has often brought 
about a conflict with non-Indians when it involved legal 
problems or the question of tribal sovereignty or for that 
matter self-determination. P.L. 638, in its present form, 
is not flexible enough to cover all tribes with varying 
economic bases and resources.
Besides Congress, the Department of Interior, the BIA, 
and the Indians there is also the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) that has played pivotal roles before in policy 
implementation. OMB is the "gate keeper" in the interchange 
between the executive agency and Congress. It may not 
violate an act of Congress in judging the BIA’s procedures 
for implementing policy, but it does make sure to see that 
White House policy is not violated either. It has a large 
amount of political power because its position is near the 
top of the executive hierarchy, next to the President, and 
because it controls personnel positions, budget requests and 
administrative procedures among all the agencies. Being 
"high up on the ladder," it is very sensitive to the 
political wants of the American electorate. OMB's 
responsiveness to BIA or Indian needs is in part determined 
by the executive estimate of the political importance of 
Indian affairs among American voters. It is common 
knowledge that taking a stand on Indian issues is often a 
"no-win" situation.
The implementation or lack of it of P.L. 638 can be 
traced to factors that plagued its process and progress.
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First, an organization faced with the loss of power, 
personal benefits and prestige will often work counter to 
stated policy. Second, questions are raised about the type 
of tactic which an organization will use to advocate their 
position. Third, the lack of leadership in an organization 
will create an atmosphere which allows units of the 
organization to act independently and counter to the 
objectives of an organization. Fourth, it is suggested that 
a comprehensive planning process be implemented if the 
change is to be successful. Fifth, there must be clear 
lines of communication between organizations to increase the 
chances of success in achieving policy goals. Sixth, there 
must be an agreement of what Indian self-determination means 
to each organization and its subsystems (Downs, 1967).
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INTERPRETATION UNDER THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION
In the agency’s defense, the program was still quite 
new in 1978. The regulation had been out for only two and a 
half years; even though the BIA and IHS had been contracting 
some of their programs long before the advent of P.L. 638. 
The point that bothered most Indian leaders was that was 
their wariness or fulfillment of their longstanding 
expectations of incompetence and unresponsiveness about 
bureaucrats, especially those working for the BIA (Indian 
Town Hall Meeting, 1981). If the entire self-determination 
concept were to be effectively implemented, the number of 
BIA jobs would be drastically reduced. One of the main 
justifications for implementing P.L. 638 was that it would 
eventually decrease the personnel and expense of Federal 
administration of Indian Affairs (Bee, 1982).
Hearing all the criticisms of BIA and IHS handling of 
implementation, the Senate Select Committee concluded that 
the will of Congress was being thwarted. Two solutions were 
decided upon; introduce a legislative answer for some of 
the contracting processes and hold oversight hearings on 
BIA's apparent half-hearted efforts at reorganization.
In 1977, work was begun on a bill (S. 2460) to amend 
P.L. 93-638 (Senate Select Committee Hearings, 1978). The 
proposal would make it possible for Indian tribes to obtain 
a single block grant for multifaceted tribal programs
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replacing existing BIA and/or IHS services or any new 
programs the tribe might design. If they wished, the tribes 
could continue the contracting procedures set forth in Title 
I of P.L. 638. The block grants would greatly reduce the 
amount of proposal writing, accounting, circumvent delays 
and other obstacles reported that had become part of the 
process in contracting for a service. However, the tribes 
would be required to submit comprehensive plans for use of 
the grants and these plans would have to be approved for 
funding by the Secretary of the Interior or HEW depending on 
which department the program's grant would cover. To 
circumvent earlier problems found by the GAO report it was 
stipulated that tribal proposals would be approved on the 
basis of established criteria and not on the basis of the 
reviewing officials own opinion or priorities. This, 
hopefully, would lessen alleged reports of officials playing 
politics with tribal awards. It would also mean the end of 
the agencies' skimming of contract funds to hire consultants 
or additional staff without the tribes' approval.
Hearings were held in 1978 concerning S. 2604. Tribal 
support of this amendment and various testimony was given by 
different tribes and Indian groups urged passage of the 
amendment proposal.
On March 22, 1978, the Federal agencies got a chance to 
testify. Both assistant Secretary Gerard of the BIA and Dr. 
Emery Johnson of IHS submitted prepared statements. BIA 
opposed the bill and made the argument that the same
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objectives could be accomplished using Federal laws already 
in the books; including 638. When questioned by Senator 
Abourzek what the problem was, the BIA witnesses stated that 
the BIA cannot issue block grants of the type specified in 
the proposal until the OMB guidelines have been fully 
developed (Senate Hearings, 1978).
IHS felt there were serious administrative problems 
inherent in the proposed amendment but given time to make 
the proper adjustments it would support the amendment. OMB 
later sent a written answer to the Select Committee and said 
that without a test case it could not tell if P.L. 638 
regulations could be changed to allow a tribe to combine 
both IHS and BIA programs in a single block grant.
S. 2460 was redrafted incorporating some suggested 
changes by the agencies and public testimony at the hearings 
but elections took up too much time and S. 2460 died in 
Committee at the end of the 95th Congress. S. 2460 was not 
reintroduced in the 96th Congress. The Congressional 
attempt to shape up the executive branch’s implementation of 
a policy had failed. From the prepared statements BIA was 
not at all pleased by S. 2460's proposed limitations on 
staff and operations and it could not and would not be 
pinned down to a specific timetable for change. The BIA 
could not be accused of foot-dragging for there was lack of 
a test case to draw conclusions from.
The Select Committee had accomplished something for 
P.L. 638 reform. By introduction of amendments, gathering
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agency comments and holding hearings, it began to build a 
legislative record for reform measures. If the advocates of 
reform are persistent enough and manage to reintroduce a 
revision to policy like S. 2460, Congress has a record on 
which to base an opinion.
The House, on June 26, 1978, defeated a Senate-passed 
bill (S. 666) that would have allowed non-Indian employees 
of the BIA and the IHS to retire earlier and with greater 
benefits than other Civil Service workers. S. 666 was 
designed to aid non-Indian employees adversely affected by 
laws that gave Indians preference in the agencies hiring, 
promotions and other employment practices. Opponents of the 
bill claimed that the bill was a move to give further 
preference to Indians and raised the possibility of an 
Indian takeover of the agency as non-Indians retired. They 
also claimed the legislation was unfair to other Civil 
Service employees who would not get the special benefits as 
well as claiming the cost would be unjustifiable (Congress 
and the Nation, 1981).
Since there are twenty-six steps to be met in gaining a 
contract, many tribes decided they could administer a 
program. During 1977 there were 90 contracts signed. The 
employees of the BIA soon discovered that if the Bureau 
continues to contract programs to local Indian communities, 
it will eventually be forced to reduce the size of its staff 
and maybe even be dissolved (American Indian Studies Center, 
1979). As a result of contracting, the BIA's client
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population changes. It was also at this time the Department 
of the Interior and the BIA went through a reorganization. 
The position of Commissioner of Indian Affairs was not 
permanently filled since 1976 and the position of Assistant 
Secretary-Indian Affairs was newly begun when Forrest Gerard 
was appointed toward the end of 1977 (Senate Select 
Committee on Indian Affairs, 1978). With the possible 
disappearance of the client population and the BIA without 
leadership, the employees of the BIA were experiencing 
distress and massive threat. Few bureaucratic organizations 
have ever been faced with this type of massive threat. To 
make matters worse the BIA was caught in a push for change 
from the top - the Congress as well as the President - and 
the bottom - the client population - (Taylor, 1983). The 
Congress and the President provided the push from the top by 
cutting funding for the Interior and the BIA. The OMB also 
had a hand in pushing fiscally for three funding changes 
made in the Interior department and the BIA which still had 
a number of vacancies. No longer needed to operate the 
schools or the building of roads, the BIA of the future 
would be reduced both in prestige and status. The entire 
character of the BIA would have to change. It is little 
wonder it went to war with its clients. The BIA was 
fighting for its survival.
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REINTERPRETATION UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
The Reagan Administration has not put forth many new 
proposals for a change except to lower many domestic 
budgets. From 1980 to present the Committee has recommended 
budget cuts and gotten them. They did, however, reject a 
proposal by the administration to consolidate 10 Indian 
programs under a block grant approval (Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac, 1981). When this particular proposal was 
unveiled an Indian advocacy group called the National Tribal 
Governments called for Interior Secretary James Watt's 
resignation because he failed to confer with the plan for 
this proposal with its members. This committee stated that 
if the current administration wanted to pursue the use of 
block grants, it should first get the support of the tribes 
and then try a demonstration project. Mr. Watt would 
eventually resign as of Oct. 9, 1983 for his use of ill- 
humor about his appointees.
Reagan did strike a blow against self-determination by 
pocket vetoing S. 2623 which would have authorized federal 
assistance for the construction of new facilities at the 
Indian schools for the nation's 18 tribally controlled 
Indian community colleges; as well as endowment funds. He 
did this on the grounds that the bill contained conflicting 
and vague language and the contention that support of the 
colleges was not part of Federal Governments trust
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responsibility toward Indian tribes. He was also opposed to 
spending money at a time that demands fiscal restraint 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1982).
President Reagan more than tried to out do Jimmy Carter 
in freeing the Government from the burden of Indian trust.
It almost seems incredulous that he would reiterate what 
Nixon said, "Self-determination without termination." He 
had a Secretary of Interior who was almost to the point of 
being anti-Indian (Ortiz, 1984).
There may still be a hidden agenda by the Area Offices 
which is to stop all contracting and the restoration of BIA 
control over all major functions. Whatever happens, the BIA 
must adapt or it will not survive. Presently this is a 
situation that may meet the needs of both parties if they 
can resolve their differences. What is suggested is that 
the role of the BIA needs to change from one of parent to 
one of being an advisor, colleague and advocate of the 
tribe. If the BIA resists every effort of the people to 
work for their own benefit, then the need for the Bureau 
will eventually cease to exist. If the BIA can act as the 
chief spokesman for tribal needs and advocate Indian needs 
in the Congress and in Congressional Committees and act in 
concert with the Tribes by providing quality technical 
assistance, the Bureau will survive.
A second possibility for the BIA although not as good 
as the first one, is that as Indian Preference in the BIA 
increases the number of Indian employees in middle and upper
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Civil Service levels, the BIA and the Tribes can begin to 
merge. The problem with this practice is that Tribal 
priorities could be displaced with Bureau priorities and 
this solution contains the seeds of potential conflict.
This author mentions these in passing as a temporary method 
or beginning of the total process of self-determination.
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EVALUATION
There are many things that have gone wrong with this 
policy. Blame cannot be directed at one single entity. 
Congress, in its impatience to end the cost of Indian 
administration, has given the BIA more money for new plans 
to phase itself out than for the maintenance of old 
programs. The agency periodically prepares for dissolution, 
then persuades Congress that Indians are still unprepared to 
assume responsibility and must therefore be returned to a 
state of supervision. Has the BIA convinced Congress that 
Indians are too poorly trained to manage their own affairs? 
Part of the real problem could be because the Indians and 
their leaders have never been allowed to control their 
economic resources. When the BIA permits its role as 
regulator to be experimentally suspended, it is careful that 
no real power over resources is transferred. By this means, 
the expectation of Indian incompetency is inevitably 
reconfirmed for Congress (Deloria, 1985).
This study has attempted to cover some of the major 
problems that presently face the policy making level of 
Indian affairs. With the creation of the new federal 
policy, self-determination, the top level administrators in 
Indian affairs are forced into a new position with regard to 
their responsibilities toward the Indians. They shifted 
from role of "Father" to that of "Brother." This change
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calls for an adjustment in attitudes on the part of all 
involved. However, a century and a half of tradition in 
administrative relations is not easy to reverse; for the 
administration or the Indians.
There is a desperate need for a precise definition of 
self-determination. Everyone wants Indian self- 
determination but few agree on its meaning. The Federal 
Government believes that the policy means self-government in 
the sense that the tribes become self-sufficient. The 
Indians think that the policy means self-government in the 
sense that the tribes become sovereign nations, while 
retaining special privileges such as tax immunity and 
financial support from the United States Government. This 
is a glaring lack of communication existing today between 
the two parties. Except for some reluctance by the Congress 
to part with their dependent "child," the Federal 
Government sincerely would like to see the Indian nation 
self-sufficient and running most of their programs. This 
would certainly take an administrative burden off 
Washington's shoulders. Most Indians want to retain their 
special positions and privileges, which are very helpful at 
times. Their goal is to become more self-sufficient within 
their tribal units with free governments. In a conversation 
with Professor Sam Deloria there was mention of an Alvin M. 
Josephy concept of self-determination which this author 
agrees with. Josephy said that the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
must be stripped of its authority over the tribes and
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become, in fact as well as in theory, a service organization 
that is limited in its functions to the delivery of 
expertise, services and credit to Indian clients at their 
request. To carry out the trustee function, Mr. Josephy 
felt that a special management and legal apparatus should be 
created within the Federal Government, separate from the BIA 
service delivery organization and responsible to the Indians 
alone and charged with a commitment to the trust 
obligation. Its function must be the management of trustee 
affairs and the determined affairs and protection of tribal 
lands, water rights, mineral and other resources. Its 
relationship to the Indians should be similar to that of a 
bank and lawyer to their client and it should have nothing 
to do with any other phase of the Indian’s life.
P.L. 638 is designed to be a policy of termination. It 
terminates the Indians dependency on the U.S. Government.
It terminates the BIA and various agencies in the U.S. 
Government. It terminates the second-class citizenship for 
the Native American. It terminates the Indians' 
paternalistic relationship with the U.S. Government.
However, no one has taken into account that no agency will 
voluntarily let itself be destroyed or fragmented (Downs, 
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